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I. ARGUMENT 
A. THERE REMAIN GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT ON 
MICKELSEN'S FRAUD CLAIMS WHICH PREVENT BROADWAY 
FORD FROM PREVAILING ON SUMMARY JlJDGMENT 
1. The truck was leased with the fraudulent representation that it came with a full 
bumper-to-bumper warranty. 
This action is one for fraud, not breach of warranty. Broadway Ford's assertion 
that it "never represented to Mickelsen that there was a 'dealer warranty' or any other 
warranty given by Broadway Ford with respect to the vehicle" is immaterial. 
Respondent's Brief, at 11. Broadway Ford may have this Court believe that since it did 
not personally warranty the truck and its component parts, it cannot be held liable. But 
Mickelsen has not claimed breach of a "dealership warranty," but rather that Broadway 
Ford made fraudulent misrepresentations concerning the Ford factory warranties. 
Broadway's argument is a "red herring" argument, intended to distract the listener from 
the real claim. 
The facts are that Broadway leased the new truck with the representation of a full 
Ford factory warranty and now acknowledges that the lift kit and tires were not covered 
by the Ford bumper-to-bumper warranty.1 See Ford Window Sticker in Dep. of Tanner 
Mickelsen at Ex. 1, p. 13, taken 4/8/2010, augmented 5/412011; Dep. of Randy Cate at 83, 
taken 6/1812010, augmented 5/412011; Dep. of Steve Riersen, as attachment to Aff. of 
Bron Rammell, taken 7/612010, augmented 7/712011; and Dep. of Mont Crnkovich at 57, 
. I Broadway Ford attempts to dispute this fact in its Respondent's Brief, stating that "[s]uch a statement is 
unfounded, as evidenced by Mickelsen's failure to cite anywhere in the record to support such a statement." 
Respondent's Brie/at 24. However, Mickelsen cites to three different parts of the record, including the 
depositions of Randy Cate, Steve Riersen and Mont Crnkovich, which all admit that the lift kit and tires 
were not covered under the warranty as Broadway Ford had originally represented. 
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taken 6122/2010, augmented 5/412011. Broadway's representations that the truck came 
with a full Ford factory bumper-to-bumper warranty, covering all parts were made 
fraudulently, or at least as a mutual mistake. 
a. Void vs. Voidable/Unwarrantable Repairs. 
In its brief, Broadway Ford implies that Mickelsen has "quibble[ d] over the exact 
name given the warranty," and that he is "attempting to 'split hairs' regarding the 
nomenclature relating to the warranty." Respondent's Brief, at 20-21. Yet simultaneously 
Broadway Ford quibbles significantly over the characterization of the warranty as being 
"void" as opposed to having repairs denied under warranty. [d. at 16, 17 & 25. 
Regardless of whether the warranty was absolutely voided or whether repairs 
were denied under warranty (which they indisputably were), the representation that the 
truck was covered by a Ford bumper-to-bumper warranty was fraudulent. Mickelsen's 
statements regarding a "voided" or "void" warranty regard that portion of any warranty 
which may have covered the steering gear box and drag link, and not necessarily the 
entire warranty covering the entire truck. Tanner has freely acknowledged that he had to 
pursue several repairs on his truck under the Ford factory warranty prior to the 
culminating problems with the steering gear box and drag link. Rat 163, q[ 26. He hardly 
argues that the entirety of the Ford factory warranty was voided, but rather that the 
addition of certain non-factory parts voided the warranty as to the particular issues and 
repairs he needed. What is important behind this semantic dispute is the question: was 
the truck fully covered, per Broadway Ford's representations, or was it not? 
It is significant that Ford Manufacturing's Warranty and Policy Manual notes that 
"[ c ]ustomers purchasing Ford vehicles that have been modified, altered, or final stage 
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manufactured by an entity other than Ford must be informed that the modified parts, as 
well as Ford parts that fail because of the modification, are not covered by either the 
Ford New Vehicle Limited Warranty or ESP." R at 367 (emphasis added). Broadway 
Ford, by failing to inform Mickelsen of the non-coverage of the non-factory parts, as well 
as all parts that fail because of the non-factory parts, not only committed fraud, but also 
violated Ford Company policy. More importantly, it made the warranty voidable, at least 
in part, as to subsequent repairs related to the non-factory parts added, namely, the drag 
link and steering gear box. This is significant because Broadway Ford attempts, in 
several portions of its brief, to assert that the truck was in fact covered fully under 
warranty, whether by Ford factory warranty or those warranties of the non-factory parts 
manufacturers. Respondent's Brief, at 6,21,23 & 25. The excerpt of the Ford Warranty 
and Policy Manual cited herein demonstrates that although the non-factory parts may 
have been covered under some separate individual part warranty, their interaction with 
the original Ford factory parts "voided" the Ford warranty not only as to the non-factory 
parts themselves, but all parts affected by the modification. 
h. Mickelsen's failure to read and understand the factory warranty. 
Broadway Ford points out, several times, that Mickelsen did not read or know all 
of the terms and conditions of his warranty aside from the fact that it contained a 3 year, 
36,000 mile bumper-to bumper warranty and a 5 year, 60,000 mile power train warranty. 
Respondent's Brief, at 16, 17 & 20. Although Broadway Ford makes much noise 
concerning Mickelsen's failure to educate himself as to the terms and conditions of his 
truck's warranty, Broadway Ford cannot produce one term or condition which would 
preclude Mickelsen from having a repair done under the "full bumper-to-bumper" 
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warranty aside from the after-market parts exclusion in the Warranty and Policy Manual. 
R at 367. Very simply, the burden is on the dealer, Broadway Ford, to have informed 
Mickelsen, and other buyers and lessees, of the non-Ford parts and their respective 
effects on the Ford bumper-to-bumper warranty. Id. 
2. That Discoverv Ford eventually repaired the same issue "under warranty" is 
neither dispositive nor informative for purposes of Mickelsen 's fraud claims. 
Broadway Ford inserts a "red herring" into the mix by contending that the fact 
that Discovery Ford ultimately fixed the steering gear box and drag link, purportedly 
"under the Ford Manufacturer's warranty," means that the truck "always had a 'bumper-
to-bumper' warranty" and that no fraud was committed. Respondent's Brief, at 6 & 18. 
This later repair is neither dispositive of the warranty issue, nor informative in 
determining whether a warranty existed as to Mickelsen and the truck when leased by 
him. 
The heart of the matter is that Mickelsen's injury and cause of action for fraud 
arose when Broadway Ford fraudulently misrepresented to him that the truck came with a 
full Ford factory bumper-to-bumper warranty. The denial of warranty coverage, per 
Respondent's own characterization and that of Laura Riley, the warranty administrator at 
Discovery Ford, is discretionary, based on whether the after-market parts are the "root" 
of the problem. Id. at 27 and R at 377, Ll. 12-15. An ordinary purchaser, like Mickelsen, 
is in no position to challenge that discretion and the claims of warranty administrators 
and mechanics with technical knowledge. And yet, Mickelsen tried to understand the 
problem and even confirmed through Ford Manufacturing that Discovery Ford's decision 
was upheld by Ford. Dep. Laura Riley at Ex. 4, taken 7/1412010, augmented 5/412011. 
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Throughout all of this, Broadway Ford did not take any action to ensure that its 
representation of a full bumper-to-bumper warranty was honored. Jd.; R at 164-65, 1[1[ 38-
48. There is no record that they ever called Ford Manufacturing to dispute Discovery 
Ford's denials. Instead, Broadway Ford washed its hands and placed the full burden on 
Mickelsen, expecting him to spend even more money to get what he had already 
presumably paid for. 
The best that can be said for Discovery Ford is that they originally made a 
discretionary call to deny coverage to Mickelsen and then grant coverage to another 
person. The worst is that the same technician who determined that the exact same repair 
should be processed under the Ford warranty for the new owner was perpetrating a fraud 
on Ford Manufacturing. R at 391, Ll. 5-15. The fact that Discovery Ford acquired the 
truck at auction and then subsequently repaired it and sold it to a relative of a Discovery 
Ford employee (the same service manager who told Mickelsen the repairs were not 
reparable under Ford warranty) is a bit disturbing. Dep. of Leo Gonzalez, at 17-19, Ll. 19-
25, 1-25, 1-19, taken 7/14/2010, augmented 5/412011; Rat 164, qm 34-37 & 41-42. 
Broadway Ford claims that Mickelsen has "sued the wrong party." R at 65 and 
Respondent's Brief, at 26. This insinuates that Mickelsen should have sued Discovery 
Ford instead of Broadway Ford. However, the U.C.C. does not place the burden of the 
determination of proper defendants and verifying which dealership is correct as to 
discretionary warranty coverage decision before exercising rescission under the U.C.c. 
Mickelsen, being a consumer, exercised his right to cancel under Idaho Code § 28-12-
517. He afforded Broadway Ford the option, over the course of eight months, to take 
necessary steps to verify the warranty determination, repair the truck and so forth, yet 
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Broadway Ford did nothing to help him. R at 163 & 165. Mickelsen had the right to 
depend on the discretionary denial of warranty coverage as determined by the authorized 
personnel at Discovery Ford. If anything, Broadway Ford should have sued or 
counterclaimed against Discovery Ford, but has instead opted against such action. 
Further, Broadway Ford's contention is misplaced. The subsequent fraud by 
Discovery Ford does not provide Mickelsen with a remedy for the fraud inducing the 
lease. If Broadway Ford has evidence to prove Discovery Ford fraudulently denied the 
warranty claim initially, then they have the burden of presenting evidence of this 
intervening act. They have presented none, relying only on their unfounded contention 
that, because Discovery Ford later repaired the problem via Ford "warranty," Discovery 
Ford defrauded Mickelsen. Discovery Ford's actions are frauds against Ford 
Manufacturing, not Mickelsen, since Mickelsen no longer leased the truck when 
Discovery Ford repaired the truck. Broadway Ford's argument would, therefore, 
potentially leave Mickelsen without any remedy. 
3. Causation between the addition or after-market parts and repairs being denied 
under warranty is, although not material, shown in the record. 
a. Causation is not material, as Mickelsen's claim is one for fraud, not 
warranty. 
As discussed earlier, a claim for fraud does not require the causation deemed 
necessary by Broadway Ford. Respondent's Brief, at 30. To show that the damage to the 
steering gear box and drag link was caused by the lift or any other non-Ford part is 
unnecessary, as the injury to Mickelsen in the form of fraudulent misrepresentation was 
complete when Mickelsen leased the truck based on the fraudulent misrepresentations of 
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Broadway Ford and its employees. The fraud was consummated upon purchase. If the 
fraud had been discovered before repairs were even necessary, Mickelsen could have 
brought the cause of action against Broadway Ford immediately and/or opted to rescind 
or cancel, which he eventually did. 
h. Mickelsen has shown, and the record reflects, causation. 
Even though causation need not be shown, Mickelsen can, if needed, show 
causation between the non-Ford parts and the damage to the leased truck. 
First, Mickelsen received a letter from Laura Riley, the warranty administrator at 
Discovery Ford, regarding the denial of warranty repairs on the truck. Dep. of Laura 
Riley at Ex. 1, taken 711412010, augmented 5/412011. Laura Riley stated in her letter that 
Discovery Ford's "technician inspected the vehicle and determined that the drag link and 
steering gear was worn due to the lift that had been installed on the vehicle." !d. 
Broadway Ford claims that this letter is self-impeaching hearsay, arguing that the 
technician made the determination, not Laura Riley. Respondent's Brief, at 28. However, 
Laura Riley, as warranty administrator, has the "responsibility to determine the 
warrantability of repairs at [Discovery Ford]." Dep. of Laura Riley at Ex. 1, taken 
711412010, augmented 5/412011. In addition, in her deposition, Laura Riley states that it 
was her duty to make ultimate warranty determinations for Ford. Id. at 16., Ll. 3-11. If 
this were not enough, Randy McNair states that the custodian of all the documents in the 
warranty file for Discovery Ford is Laura Riley and that she would be the one to tum to 
for acquiring documents on Mickelsen's warranty file. Dep. of Randy McNair at 22, Ll. 
11-25, at 23, Ll. 1-12. As such, Ms. Riley's determination as to causation and 
warrantability are final as to Ford warranties and must be given due credibility for 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF-PAGE 9 
purposes of establishing causation. Laura Riley was simply acting as an agent of 
Discovery Ford, which, for purposes of walTanty administration, served as an agent of 
Ford Manufacturing. 
Most importantly, however, is that Ford Manufacturing itself stood behind the 
decision not to honor a walTanty for the steering gear box and drag link repairs. In its 
CUDL Report, Ford Manufacturing makes it clear that "[a]fter reviewing the situation 
with [the] Service Manager, there [were] no walTanties or other coverage available that 
would provide assistance." Dep. Laura Riley at Ex. 4, taken 711412010, augmented 
5/4/2011. Further, Ford went on to state that it "support[ ed] the decision made by the 
dealership." Id. Ford Manufacturing itself stood by the determination of Laura Riley and 
Discovery Ford in denying warranty repairs, instead directing Mickelsen to contact 
Broadway Ford, which is exactly what he did. !d. 
4. Mickelsen's argument that damages accrued upon the fraud itself is not a new 
argument made on appeal. 
Broadway Ford attempts to bar one of Mickelsen's arguments on appeal by 
claiming that it is new and not before advanced. Respondent's Brief, at 31. The 
argument, as explained above, is that Mickelsen's damages did not accrue upon denial of 
his walTanty repairs, but rather that damages accrued when Mickelsen leased the truck 
based on the fraudulent representations of Broadway Ford. This argument has been 
Mickelsen's theory since at least the time of filing of his Amended Complaint, which 
prays for rescission and damages of less than $25,000 on the first count of fraud. This 
argument is advanced in Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motions 
for Summary Judgment. Filed 711212010, augmented 7/6/2011. Therein, Mickelsen 
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argues that his "consequent and proximate injury was III the fact that Defendants 
represented that he had a full bumper to bumper warranty, when he indisputably did not." 
!d. at 10. Mickelsen makes no mention of his damages accruing at a later date based on 
different theories or circumstances. Instead, he clearly advances the same argument he 
now advances-that he was injured upon Broadway Ford's misrepresentations, 
"regardless of Broadway Ford's recent argument that the lift kit did not cause the 
problem." !d. 
In addition to this very specific argument, Mickelsen argues this theory elsewhere 
in the record, including in the Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment. This is not the 
first time Mickelsen has advanced this argument. 
Even had this been Mickelsen's first time arguing such a theory, the cases cited 
by Broadway Ford in support of its argument deal with cases which actually went to trial 
(or a full administrative hearing), Mickelsen's arguments have not been made in the 
context of a trial but rather in the context of a motion for summary judgment. To require 
Mickelsen to do more would essentially require a "paper trial." 
5. There is no duty to mitigate damages under the common law or the U. C. C. 
remedies of rescission and cancellation. 
Broadway Ford argues that Mickelsen is barred from incidental damages, which 
would suffice to prove injury, one of the elements of a fraud claim. Respondent's Brief, at 
31. However, under both the U.C.c. and common law, there is no further duty to 
mitigate in addition to invoking the remedy of rescission. In essence, the rescission is the 
mitigation. 
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Under the U.C.C., Mickelsen's available remedies under Idaho Code § 28-12-523 
include cancellation of the contract for lease, as contained in Idaho Code § 28-12-505. 
As Mickelsen exercised his U.C.C. cancellation remedy, no further duty to mitigate 
existed.2 
The same applies for the common law remedy of rescission. The doctrine of 
mitigation "does not apply in actions to rescind a contract, since the duty to mitigate only 
arises out of a breach of a valid contract." 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 352. 
Broadway Ford's argument that no incidental damages may lie due to 
Mickelsen's failure to "mitigate" is incorrect and not supported by law. 
B. THE MISREPRESENTATIONS ~IADE WERE MATERIAL UNDER 
BOTH THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE At'lD COMMON LAW 
Broadway Ford argues that the misrepresentations made by Broadway Ford were 
not "material," thus defeating Mickelsen's fraud claim both under the UCC and the 
common law. 
1. Common law materialitv. 
First, when analyzing common law materiality for fraud claims, Broadway states 
that Mickelsen incorrectly recites the basis for the court's decision on the issue of 
materiality. Respondent's Brief, at 20. After further review of the District Court's 
Memorandum Decision, Mickelsen strongly disagrees with this assertion, and he further 
counters that Broadway Ford itself incorrectly recites the basis for the court's decision. 
2 Broadway Ford states that Mickelsen declined repairs and ceased making lease payments as "a 
matter of principle." Respondent's Brief, at 31, fnA (quoting Dep. Tanner Mickelsen, at 42, Ll. 1-4, taken 
7114/2010, augmented 5/412011). However, in the same breath, Mickelsen states that he declined repairs 
given "the fact that [he] would not have leased a vehicle if it had not had [a] warranty." Dep. Tanner 
Mickelsen, at 42, Ll. 3-4, taken 7/1412010, augmented 5/412011. The principle upon which Mickelsen 
declined repairs, therefore, was the principle of law providing for rescission and cancellation of a lease 
contract for nonconforming goods. 
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Broadway Ford posits that the District Court's decision was based on its fmding that "all 
parts were covered by a warranty." Respondent's Brief, at 20. The District Court states: 
Plaintiff testified that Defendant Broadway Ford informed 
him prior to purchasing the Vehicle that the lift-kit and 
tires were after-market parts. The record also reflects 
that, although not covered by a factory warranty, the lift-
kit and tires were subject to a supplier's warranty. 
Given these facts, it is umeasonable to believe that 
Defendant Broadway Ford knew or had reason to know that 
Plaintiff regarded a factory warranty on the after-market 
parts as critical or fundamental to the transaction .... That 
the lift kit and tires were not covered by a "factory" 
warranty is insignificant, particularly where the after 
market parts did not adversely affect the factory 
warranty. 
R at 424 (emphasis added). As is clearly seen, the court based its opinion on these 
three findings, and the analysis in Mickelsen's Appellate Brief is on point and germane to 
the issue of materiality under the common law elements of fraud. 
Second, Broadway Ford argues that it is umeasonable to believe Mickelsen 
attached such importance to the transaction, given that "1) all parts of the truck were in 
fact covered by a warranty, 2) the existence of the tires, rims and lift were fully disclosed 
to Mickelsen as non-Ford manufactured components, and 3) Mickelsen specifically 
sought to lease a truck with a 'lift.'" Respondent's Brief, at 21. Even though all parts of 
the truck may have been covered under individual, non-Ford warranties, the Ford 
Warranty and Policy Manual specifically states that "Ford parts that fail because of the 
modification[] are not covered by either the Ford New Vehicle Limited Warranty or 
ESP." R at 367 (emphasis added). Consequently, the conclusion that all parts of the truck 
were covered by a warranty is not only unsupported by the record, but is not a valid basis 
for finding a lack of materiality since even though a non-Ford part itself may be 
covered under warranty, its interaction with Ford parts is not covered. 
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More compellingly, however, is the fact that, notwithstanding that the tires, rims 
and lift were disclosed to Mickelsen as non-Ford parts and that Mickelsen specifically 
sought to lease a truck with a lift, he still asked for, and Broadway Ford gave him, 
assurances that the entire truck was under a full "factory" bumper-to-bumper warranty, 
which, by the admissions of three agents of Broadway Ford, was untrue. R at 162; Dep. of 
Randy Cate at 83, taken 6118/2010, augmented 5/4/2011; Dep. of Steve Riersen, as 
attachment to Aff. of Bron Rammel!, taken 7/6/2010, augmented 71712011; and Dep. of 
Mont Crnkovich at 57, taken 6/22/2010, augmented 5/4/2011. The three grounds upon 
which the District Court found materiality lacking (which Mickelsen already individually 
addressed in his Appellate Brief) are the subject of genuine issues of material fact, and 
Broadway Ford was put on notice of how fundamental to the transaction the factory 
bumper-to-bumper warranty was to Mickelsen. 
2. Uniform Commercial Code materiality. 
In its brief, Broadway Ford attempts to transform the subjective test of materiality 
under the Uniform Commercial Code into an objective test by quoting Jensen v. Seigel 
Mobile Homes Group. 105 Idaho 189, 668 P.2d 65 (1983). It appears to Mickelsen that 
Broadway Ford has taken some liberties with the Jensen text in order to give it the 
meaning Broadway Ford desires. It interjects the word "however" (in the contrasting 
sense of the word) between two sentences where no contrast exists. Respondent's Brief, 
at 22. In doing so, Broadway Ford insinuates that, although the first portion of the quoted 
text from Jensen establishes a "subjective test" interpretation, the portion following the 
"however" advocates an objective test. 
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The word Broadway Ford has added, "however," replaces the phrase "As 
illustrated in Jorgensen," referring to Jorgensen v. Pressnall, 274 Or. 285, 545 P.2d 1382 
(Or. 1976), an Oregon Supreme Court case dealing with the definition of "substantially 
impairs" in the U.C.C. context. Jensen, 105 Idaho at 193. In Jorgensen, the Court sets 
forth a two-step test for determining whether "materiality" is met for purposes of the 
U.C.C. and whether the nonconformities were sufficiently serious to justify revocation of 
acceptance. 274 Or. 289. The first step or inquiry is a "subjective question in the sense 
that it calls for a consideration of the needs and circumstances of the plaintiff who seeks 
to revoke; not the needs and circumstances of the average buyer," being a completely 
subjective test. Id. The second step or inquiry is: 
whether the nonconformity in fact substantially impairs the 
value of the goods to the buyer, having in mind his 
particular needs. This is an objective question in the 
sense that it calls for something more than plaintiff's 
assertion that the nonconformity impaired the value to him; 
it requires evidence from which it can be inferred that 
plaintiff's needs were not met because of the 
nonconformity. 
Id. at 290 (emphasis added). The test provided in Jorgensen, and adopted in 
Jensen, has an objective second step only in that it calls for some evidence that the 
nonconformity substantially impairs the value of the goods to the buyer, having in mind 
his particular needs. 
In the present case there is at the very least a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether the nonconformity, or the admitted lack of a full bumper-to-bumper warranty, 
kept Mickelsen's needs from being met in the underlying lease transaction. The reality is 
that Mickelsen, in obtaining a lease for a new truck, instead of purchasing or getting a 
used truck, planned on having a hassle-free and fully warranted driving experience, and 
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made the importance of this feature very well-known through his asking multiple 
Broadway Ford employees multiple times whether the bumper-to-bumper warranty 
covered the entire truck and whether it would be covered at any Ford dealership. R at 
162. At the very least, these facts and others in the record permit a strong inference that 
the nonconforming warranty substantially impaired the value of the truck to Mickelsen, 
resulting in a "material misrepresentation." 
C. l\lICKELSEN'S ARGUMENT THAT REVOCATION IS AN ISSUE FOR A 
JURY DOES NOT ATTKMPT TO ARGUE SIMULTANEOUSLY THAT UCC 
REl\1EDIES CANNOT BE DEFEATED ON SUM.\-IARY JUDGl\1ENT. 
Broadway Ford seems to misunderstand Mickelsen's argument that, in the event 
this Court reverses the District Court's decision and remands this matter to the District 
Court for further proceedings, the District Court will have no basis in law for trying 
Mickelsen's Uniform Commercial Code cancellation claims otherwise than through a 
jury. Mickelsen makes no claim or argument that summary judgment is precluded as to 
legal remedies. The District Court found that Mickelsen's "only remedy lies in equity, 
[so] the Court would be the trier of fact if the case proceeded to trial." R at 423. 
Mickelsen disagrees with this assertion and asks this Court to appropriately instruct the 
District Court that the U.C.C. remedy of cancellation lies in law and presents a question 
of fact for a jury. 
D. APPELLANT DISPUTES RESPONDENT'S VERSION OF THE FACTS 
AND NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant, Tanner Mickelsen ("Mickelsen") disputes several assertions by 
Respondent, Broadway Ford, particularly those that are misstatements of important facts 
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in the record. Only a few will be addressed herein, however, in an attempt to focus on 
those issues most pertinent to the case at hand. 
Broadway Ford would have the Court believe that Mickelsen simply "abandoned 
the truck, stopped making lease payments and sued Broadway Ford for misrepresentation 
concerning the warranty" when the warranty repairs on his truck were denied. 
Respondent's Brief, at 5; see Id. at 12. In contrast, it is an undisputed fact that, once the 
repairs on the truck's drag link and steering gear box had been denied, Mickelsen 
continued to communicate with Broadway Ford and Ford Manufacturing, Inc., and 
continued to make lease payments for eight (8) months. R. at 165, 1[1[ 50, 53-54. 
Furthermore, at the end of eight months of attempting to informally resolve the issues and 
continuing to make lease payments, Mickelsen finally opted to rescind the contract with 
Broadway Ford. Id. at 55. He also communicated to U.S. Bank where they could retrieve 
the truck. Id. at 56. At no time did he "abandon" it. 
Additionally, Broadway Ford claims that the truck "always had ... a supplier's 
warranty covering all non-Ford parts, including the tires, custom wheels and lift kit." 
Respondent's Brief, at 6. There is no citation to the record to support this claim. Because 
Broadway Ford's assertion cannot be supported and because all reasonable inferences 
that can be drawn from the record are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party, 
Mickelsen is entitled to the favorable inference that the non-Ford parts were not covered 
by a supplier's warranty. See Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 541, 808 P.2d 876, 878 
(1991). 
Finally, in a footnote, Broadway Ford implies that counsel for Mickelsen, Bron 
Rammell, lied in the Affidavit of Bron Rammel!. Respondent's Brief, at 8, fn.I. Had 
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Broadway Ford read the entirety of the paragraph to which it cites in Mr. Rammell's 
affidavit, it would have seen that Mr. Cheney "works in areas where there is no cell 
phone service or e-mail service and is gone for days at a time" (not months or years at a 
time). R at 74, ~ 23. That Mr. Cheney provided an affidavit ten days later, then, should 
come as no surprise or as a basis for suspecting unethical and untrue statements from 
Mickelsen's counsel. Mickelsen points out this fact in the record to the Court only for 
purposes of showing his good faith and that of his counsel, contrary to the insinuations of 
Broadway Ford. 
II. CONCLUSION 
Appellant, Tanner Mickelsen, would request, based on the preceding briefing and 
record on appeal, that the Court find the District Court decision to be in error and reverse 
such. 
DATED this 7th day of September, 2011. 
MAY, RAMMELL & THOMPSON, CHTD. 
Attorneys for Appellant 
~. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF-PAGE 18 
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I certify that on this date a copy of the foregoing Appellant's Reply Brief was 
served on the following named persons at the addresses shown an in the matter indicated. 
G. Lance Nalder, Esq. 
Nalder Law Office 
591 Park Avenue, Suite 201 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
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[ ] Facsimile (208-542-1002) 
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